Indictment by a Grand Jury Exposed to
Immune Testimony:
The Case for a Per Se Rule
Federal courts have often acknowledged the tension between
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the
state's need to compel testimony in criminal cases through the use
of immunity statutes.1 The fifth amendment states that "[no] person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself."' 2 On its face this provision allows no exceptions.
However, the courts have upheld immunity statutes on the ground
that such statutes, properly drafted and administered, have the
same ultimate effect as the privilege: ensuring that the witness will
not later be convicted on the basis of the compelled testimony.3
The federal immunity statute provides that a witness granted
immunity in order to compel his testimony at a hearing may not
refuse to testify on the basis of his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. In order to protect that privilege, information derived directly or indirectly from the compelled testimony
may not be used against the witness in any criminal case.4 This
type of immunity is usually called "use and derivative use" immunity.5 It is different from the broader "transactional immunity,"
I See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-47 (1972); Piccirillo v. N.Y., 400
U.S. 548, 562 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 58586 (1892).
2 U.S. Const. amend. V.
3 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 607-08 (1896). In addition, see notes 21-26 and accompanying text below.
" 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1985). This section reads in relevant part:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to ... a court
or grand jury of the United States, . . . and the person presiding over the proceeding
communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination;
but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case. . ..
6 It has also been labeled "use-plus-fruits immunity." See, e.g., Note, Standards for
Exclusion in Immunity Cases After Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 Yale L. J. 171, 171 (1972).
"Derivative use" occurs most often when the compelled testimony leads the prosecution to
new evidence and the prosecution attempts to introduce that evidence against the immune
1432
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which prevents indictment of the immune witness for any transaction disclosed in his testimony.'
The federal use and derivative use immunity statute was upheld against a constitutional challenge in Kastigar v. United
States,7 which held that "immunity from use and derivative use is
coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of
the privilege." 8 The Court, aware of the potential for abuse of this
testimony, placed a "heavy burden" on the prosecution of proving
that evidence was "derived from legitimate independent sources,"
rather than from the immunized testimony.9
The Kastigar standard presents a number of practical
problems in implementation, most centering on the difficulty of
proving "derivative use." 10 Another question has come to light in a
pair of recent court of appeals cases. In United States v. Hinton"
and United States v. Zielezinski, 2 the defendants were granted
use and derivative use immunity. Both defendants were then indicted by the same grand juries that had heard the compelled testimony, and the prosecutor in each case alleged an independent
basis for the indictment. 13 In Hinton, the Second Circuit held that
4
this procedure constituted a breach of "fundamental fairness"'
and disallowed it under the court's supervisory power. 15 The Ninth
Circuit took a different approach in Zielezinski, ordering a hearing
witness in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
I See Brown, 161 U.S. at 607-08 (upholding transactional immunity against fifth
amendment challenge).
7 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
8 Id. at 453. In so holding, the Court explicitly stated that full transactional immunity
is much broader than the protection afforded by the fifth amendment. Id.
I Id. at 461-62. The magnitude of this burden is discussed below at notes 77-79 and
accompanying text. When the defendant raises a challenge to the prosecution's evidence
before trial, the government is given the opportunity to prove an independent source for the
evidence at a pretrial hearing, often called a "Kastigarhearing." See notes 82-85 and accompanying text below.
"0For a discussion of these difficulties, see United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684,
687 (S.D. N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Note, 82
Yale L. J. at 181 (cited in note 5); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 187
(1972).
543 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1976).
740 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1984).
Hinton, 543 F.2d at 1007; Zielezinski, 740 F.2d at 728.
1 543 F.2d at 1010.
15Id. This supervisory power has long been recognized by the courts. See McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) ("Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence."). The scope of this authority and its use in the present situation are discussed below in notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
13
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to determine whether the indictment was obtained through use or
derivative use of the defendant's immune testimony before the
grand jury."'
This comment examines the question raised by the Hinton
and Zielezinski cases: whether a person granted immunity to testify before a grand jury may then be indicted by that same grand
jury when it has a basis for the indictment that is allegedly independent of the compelled testimony. Part I discusses the major
cases. Part II analyzes the statutory and constitutional arguments,
emphasizing Kastigar and the judicial reluctance to quash indictments on constitutional grounds.
Part III examines possible solutions to the problem. In the
first place, the courts could refuse to quash an indictment that has
been issued by a grand jury exposed to compelled testimony, on
the ground that indictments may only be overturned in cases involving extreme constitutional violations going to the heart of the
grand jury process.17 However, this comment concludes that the
courts should exercise their power to quash indictments. It then
turns to three potential procedures for deciding whether or not to
quash an indictment. First, a court might examine the evidence on
its own. Second, the court might require a pretrial hearing on the
issue of whether the indictment has a basis wholly independent of
the compelled testimony.18 If the court found that such a basis did
not exist, the indictment would be quashed. Finally, the courts
might adopt the Second Circuit's per se rule as formulated in
Hinton, quashing any indictment issued by a grand jury that has
been exposed to immunized testimony, on the ground that in such
circumstances it is impossible for the prosecution adequately to
prove a wholly independent basis for the indictment. 19 The authority for quashing may be found in the supervisory power of the fed20

eral courts.

740 F.2d at 734.
See note 67 and accompanying text below.
11 This is the approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Zielezinski, 740 F.2d at 733-34.
See also notes 104-07 and accompanying text below.
19 See Hinton, 543 F.2d at 1010 ("The prospect of peering into the grand jurors' minds,
or of examining them individually to ascertain whether Hinton's testimony was improperly
used is both impractical and unpalatable."). See also notes 108-12 and accompanying text
below. In United States v. Garrett, 797 F.2d 656, 664 (8th Cir. 1986), the Eighth Circuit
chose a slightly different approach: it required that an evidentiary hearing be held but al16
'7

lowed the district court to determine whether the government would be unable to meet its
burden in such a hearing in a specific case bec"ause of the nature of the immunized
testimony.
20 See notes 86-99 and accompanying text below. For general background, see McNabb,
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This comment concludes that the courts should exercise their
supervisory power to adopt the third alternative, an absolute rule
against indictment by the grand jury exposed to the immune testimony. This approach will, at minimal cost, eliminate a practice
that raises serious constitutional problems and will thereby protect
the integrity of the judicial system.
I.

A.

JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

The Kastigar.Background

In Kastigar v. United States,2 the Supreme Court upheld the
federal use immunity statute 22 against constitutional challenge. In
Kastigar, a defendant challenged the use of immune testimony as
evidence at trial.23 The Court's analysis focused on the relationship
between immunity statutes and the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.2 4 According to the Court, the privilege
"protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to

318 U.S. 332.
2 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
22 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1985). For many years the Court upheld only "transactional immunity" statutes, which required that the witness not be prosecuted for any transactions discussed in the compelled testimony. See Brown, 161 U.S. at 608. During that period, the
Court struck down a "use immunity" statute that did not explicitly prohibit derivative use
of the compelled testimony. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 564-65. The Court implied that only a
broader immunity statute of the transactional type could satisfy the fifth amendment burden when it asserted that "no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating [sic] question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution." Id. at 585. This dictum was
unchallenged until 1964, when for the first time the Court upheld a statute granting less
than full transactional immunity. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79 (holding that federal prosecutors
could not make use of testimony given under a state use and derivative use immunity statute). Partially in response to this narrowing of fifth amendment protection, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 6002, the use and derivative use immunity statute, which was subsequently upheld in Kastigar.406 U.S. at 452-53. For a discussion of this series of cases, see
id. at 448-53.
23

406 U.S. at 448.

" See id. at 448-53. Note that at least one Justice once argued that no immunity statute is constitutionally acceptable. Brown, 161 U.S. at 630 (Field, J., dissenting) ("No substitute for the protection contemplated by the amendment would be sufficient were its operation less extensive and efficient [than the amendment itself]."). This argument focuses on
the plain language of the amendment, arguing that it allows for no artificial legislative substitutes because no substitute can completely safeguard the bundle of rights protected by
the amendment. It is also worth noting Justice Marshall's view (though it has not been
accepted) that "because an immunity statute gives constitutional approval to the resulting
interrogation, the government is under an obligation here to remove the danger of incrimination completely and absolutely." Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 470 (dissenting opinion).
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The immunity statute

must grant protection to the witness that is at least as extensive as
the protections granted by the fifth amendment privilege, although
it need not go further.26
Applying the fifth amendment standard to the federal immunity statute, the KastigarCourt held the statute constitutional because it "prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the
compelled testimony in any respect.127 Put another way, in order

for a use immunity statute to place a witness in the same position
as if he had exercised his fifth amendment privilege, the prosecution must be prohibited from using the immunized testimony in
any way against him. This requirement is the core of the Kastigar
decision.
Two difficulties arise in extending Kastigar's requirements to
the situation presented in Hinton and Zielezinski. The first issue
is whether Kastigar'sholding applies in the grand jury context. In
cases like Hinton and Zielezinski, a defendant seeks to quash an
indictment altogether-rather than simply exclude pieces of evidence to be used against him at trial-on the ground that the indictment was obtained by use of his immunized testimony.28 Nevertheless, this comment concludes that the Kastigar requirement
must extend to grand jury situations like those in Hinton and
Zielezinski.
The second difficulty in applying Kastigar is whether the procedures suggested by that case for ensuring evidence is derived
solely from sources independent of the immunized testimony are
appropriate and sufficient to resolve a challenge to an indictment.
The first procedural requirement imposed by the Court in the particular situation of Kastigarrelates to the government's burden of
proof; the second centers on the procedures to be used by lower
25
26

406 U.S. at 444-45 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 453. This principle runs through many of the cases in this area. Consider, for

example, Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 (1956) ("Immunity displaces the danger [of criminal punishment that is the basis of the privilege]. Once the reason for the privilege ceases, the privilege ceases.").
17 406 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
28 For example, see Garrett, 797 F.2d at 658 (defendant indicted by same grand jury
that heard his previous testimony); United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1526 (11th Cir.
1985) (trial court dismissed first indictment against defendant because it was returned by
same grand jury that had heard defendant's immunized testimony); United States v. Romano, 583 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1978) (upholding indictment based on defendant's proffer of
evidence to Senate subcommittee because no immunity had been granted); United States v.
Cortese, 568 F. Supp. 119, 130-31 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (a transcript of defendant's immunized
testimony before one grand jury was given to another grand jury, which indicted him).
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courts to determine whether the prosecution has met that burden.
This comment finds that although the burden should apply in the
grand jury context, the Kastigarprocedural requirements are inadequate in this situation.
B. The Per Se Rule of Hinton
In the 1976 case of United States v. Hinton,20 the defendant
testified before a grand jury on three separate days under a grant
of immunity, generating approximately 200 pages of testimony.30
The same grand jury that heard this testimony later indicted the
defendant. Despite numerous requests from defense counsel, the
trial court refused to require a hearing on the issue of whether the
indictment violated the immunity statute, holding that there was a
wholly independent basis for the indictment.3 1
In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Second Circuit determined that it would be "virtually impossible" for the government to prove a wholly independent basis for the indictment when
32
the indicting grand jury had heard the compelled testimony.
Even where the immune testimony consisted of a denial of any role
in the illegal transaction, the Court argued, the testimony still
might contribute to the indictment: the immune witness's testimony could well act as credibility evidence against him. The jury
might compare his testimony and demeanor against that of other
witnesses and might be more convinced by the latter. Once the
jury discredited the immunized testimony, they could well begin to
distrust the immune witness on other matters as also.83 If the immune witness had remained silent or had been permitted to assert
his fifth amendment privilege, these negative inferences would not
have arisen.
The decision in Hinton also emphasized the evidentiary difficulties of discerning whether the grand jury had made any use or
derivative use of the immunized testimony in issuing the indictment.3 4 The difficult question of whether the grand jury based its
indictment on evidence wholly independent of the compelled testimony could not be answered without "peering into the grand jurors' minds," a task the court found "both impractical and

9 543 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1976).
11 Id. at 1007.
1, Id. at 1007 n.6.
32

Id. at 1007-08.

33 Id. at 1009.

3, Id. at 1010. See also text at notes 106-07 below.
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unpalatable."3 5
The Second Circuit also asserted that the burden of convening
a second "untainted" grand jury was "not so onerous as to justify
the jeopardizing of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. ' 36 This
solution could be implemented at little expense by presenting the
second grand jury with transcripts of the first proceedings, excising
the immune testimony.3 7 The court concluded, therefore, that an
evidentiary hearing on improper use would not satisfactorily resolve this type of case. 8 It adopted a per se rule that an indictment by a grand jury that hears the defendant's immunized testimony will be overturned.3 9 Although the court stated that an
indictment by such a "tainted" grand jury is "fraught with applicable constitutional problems," it based its holding on an exercise
of its supervisory power rather than on the Constitution.4 0 The
Hinton decision has been approved in several later cases.4 1
C.

Case by Case Hearings under Zielezinski

42
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Zielezinski
refused to adopt the per se rule of Hinton. In Zielezinski, the defendant had been granted immunity under the federal immunity
statute in return for testimony about a series of drug transactions.
Although he denied involvement in a cocaine sale, his testimony
was contradicted by other witnesses. 43 The trial court denied a mo-

35 543 F.2d

at 1010.

36 Id.
3 This alternative might be less economically feasible, of course, in small or rural jurisdictions with only one grand jury sitting at any time. This narrow situation does not, however, justify rejection of the Hinton rule if that rule is otherwise sound.
39 543 F.2d at 1010.
39 Id.
40 Id. This reliance on the supervisory power may have been based at least in part on
doubt as to the force of constitutional protections in a grand jury proceeding. See notes 6368 and accompanying text below. The court never discussed the reasons behind its rejection
of a purely constitutional basis for the holding.
- See, e.g., United States v. Anzalone, 555 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1977). The Seventh
Circuit has indicated in dicta that it would follow Hinton under similar facts. In re Perlin,
589 F.2d 260, 269 (7th Cir. 1978). Compare Cortese, 568 F. Supp. at 130-32 (quashing indictment where transcript of immune testimony presented to second grand jury, which indicted
defendant).
In Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1524, the trial court dismissed an indictment because it was returned by the same grand jury that had heard the defendant's immune testimony. Id. at
1526. Interestingly, the government did not oppose the order to dismiss. Instead, it submitted the independent evidence to a second grand jury. The second indictment was upheld on
appeal. Id. at 1529.
2 740 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1984).
43 Id. at 728. This situation is similar to that discussed by the Second Circuit in
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tion to overturn the indictment without holding a hearing on the
matter." The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a hearing
to determine whether there was a basis for the indictment independent of the immunized testimony.4 5
The Nintn Circuit rejected the Hinton rule, both as a constitutional requirement and as an exercise of its supervisory power.46
Although acknowledging that indictment by the same grand jury
that heard the compelled testimony "threaten[s] the very integrity
of the grand jury itself," and that "[i]f an indictment is tainted,
the Constitution requires that it be quashed,14 7 the court concluded that "relatively few constitutional challenges to indictments
can be raised. '48 Because the Hinton rule did not rest on a constitutional foundation, the Ninth Circuit did not consider itself constitutionally obligated to adopt the rule.49
Instead, the court invoked its supervisory power to require a
hearing on the issue of improper use, 50 reasoning that this requirement would effectively deter governmental misconduct5 1 and would
be sufficient to "protect the integrity of the judicial process" '52 by
bringing to light improper use of compelled immunized testimony.
The court held that at the hearing, the prosecution must disprove
improper use by a preponderance of the evidence.53

Hinton. See 543 F.2d at 1009. See also text preceding note 33. The Ninth Circuit did not
address the argument that placing the defendant on the witness stand allows the grand jury
to judge his credibility even if he denies any criminal wrongdoing.
11 740 F.2d at 728-29.
45 Id. On remand, the district court found that the indictment decision was not influenced by the immune testimony, a finding that was upheld on appeal as not clearly erroneous. United States v. Zielezinski, 756 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
46 740 F.2d at 729.
11 Id. at 731.
-1 Id. The court relied here on Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); United
States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966); and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
These cases, limiting the power of courts to quash grand jury indictments, are discussed
below at notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
1, 740 F.2d at 729.
50 Id. In requiring this hearing, the court stated: "Only a hearing can convincingly establish that the command of the Fifth Amendment has been satisfied." Id. at 734. If this is
so, then one might argue that a hearing is constitutionally required. In the more recent case
of Garrett, 797 F.2d at 664, the court followed the Ninth Circuit and ordered a hearing in
the same situation. The procedure endorsed by the Eighth Circuit, however, differs from
that approved by the Ninth Circuit: Garrettwould allow a court to overturn an indictment
without a hearing in cases where it would be impossible for the prosecution to meet its
"heavy burden." Id. at 663-64.
1 740 F.2d at 733. Given the evidentiary difficulties presented by such a hearing, discussed below at notes 106-07 and accompanying text, this contention is questionable.
32 740 F.2d at
733.
3 Id. at 734.
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The Zielezinski court also recognized that the entire problem
could and should have been avoided by prohibiting indictment by
the same grand jury that had heard the immune testimony.54 To
this extent, the Court agreed with the Second and Eighth Circuits.
The only point of disagreement between the circuits is the choice
of procedures for protecting defendants' rights while minimizing
the burden on the legal system.
II.

RIGHTS OF THE IMMUNE WITNESS

As noted in part I, Hinton and Zielezinski are not typical use
immunity cases. Most use immunity cases, like Kastigar itself, involve a challenge to the use of the evidence by the prosecutor at
trial;5 5 in contrast, the cases here concern the use of the immune
testimony by the grand jury in issuing an indictment.
This difference has important implications for the scope of the
protections afforded the accused by the immunity statute and the
Constitution when there is a tainted indictment. First, although
the fifth amendment undoubtedly applies in the grand jury context,56 the rights it guarantees the accused may not be as extensive
in grand jury proceedings as at trials. The Supreme Court has been
reluctant to overturn indictments in most cases, 5 perhaps because
it believes that the cost of quashing an indictment exceeds the cost
of suppressing tainted evidence at trial.
Second, the factual distinction between tainted indictment
cases and Kastigar may counsel against the application of Kastigar's procedural requirements in cases like Hinton and Zielezinski.
Because the issues are different in the latter cases, the procedures
best suited to resolve those issues might likewise differ. In particular, the Kastigarhearing may prove inadequate to the difficult task
of probing grand jurors' minds to determine the bases they relied
on in indicting.
To resolve these issues, this section of the comment first examines the federal use immunity statute for guidance. However,

Id. ("Prosecutors should avoid permitting grand juries to indict witnesses who have
testified before them under grants of immunity."). Also consider Hinton, 543 F.2d at 1010
("convening a grand jury distinct from that which heard the immunized testimony is not so
onerous as to justify the jeopardizing of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights").
:5 See note 28 and accompanying text above.
'6 Yale Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, and Jerold H. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure
749 (5th ed. 1980) ("It has long been established that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applies to grand jury proceedings."). For further discussion, see
notes 58-62 and accompanying text below.
" See notes 63-68 and accompanying text below.
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because the statute itself is of little assistance, the comment turns
to the case law. Analysis of the case law shows that quashing an
indictment is not necessarily a constitutional requirement, and
that the situation in Hinton and Zielezinski is sufficiently different
from that in Kastigar to render Kastigar's procedural requirements inappropriate for the resolution of tainted indictment cases.
A.

The Immunity Statute

The federal use immunity statute is broadly drafted, leaving
much room for judicial interpretation. It states that "no testimony
• . .compelled under the order. . . may be used against the wit-

ness in any criminal case....

"58

The statute's application to "any

criminal case" echoes the language of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 59 Although it is conceivable that
the words "any criminal case" might be interpreted narrowly to
afford protection only at trial, the courts have uniformly concluded
that "any criminal case" includes the grand jury context for purposes of the fifth amendment privilege.6 0 Thus, the defendant may
legitimately raise the question of whether immunized testimony
was used to obtain the indictment.6 '
In addition, as the Seventh Circuit has persuasively argued,
the "legislative history [of the statute] evinces a clear intent to restrict the scope of immunity authorized by the statute to that
which is constitutionally required."62 The statutory protection is
therefore intended to be exactly coextensive with the guarantees of
the fifth amendment. The statute itself thus provides no independent guidance. In order to understand the statute's boundaries,
one must turn to the scope of the fifth amendment privilege and
58 18 U.S.C. § 6002.
5, U.S. Const. amend.

V.

60 See Counselman, 142 U.S. at 562. See also United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S.
564, 572 (1976); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ("The privilege afforded
not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal
criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime."); Kamisar et al., Criminal
Procedure at 749 (cited in note 56).
11 This construction has been accepted by nearly every court ruling on this issue. See,
e.g., Hinton, 543 F.2d at 1008 (applying Kastigar in indictment challenge case); Zielezinski,
740 F.2d at 734 (same). For the opposing approach, consider United States v. Henderson,
406 F. Supp. 417, 421-22 (D. Del. 1975) (rejecting applicability of Kastigar to grand jury
situation while acknowledging criticism of that position).
" In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Report of the Comm. on the
Judiciary on the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, H.R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 42 (1970); 1970 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 4007, 4017; and 2 National Comm'n
on Reform of the Fed. Crim. Laws, Working Papers 1412 (1970)).
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the remedies for its violation.
B.

Fifth Amendment Challenge to an Indictment

The Ninth Circuit in Zielezinski refused to adopt the Hinton
rule as a constitutional requirement, arguing that "relatively few
constitutional challenges to indictments can be raised." 3 This argument grows out of a line of Supreme Court cases suggesting that
even though the fifth amendment has force in the grand jury context, the remedy for violation of the privilege against self-incrimination in the indictment process may be limited.
The remedial issue is whether an indictment can ever be
quashed on fifth amendment grounds. If the fifth amendment is
never an appropriate basis to quash an indictment, then any procedure adopted in response to the tainted indictment cases may be
imposed, if at all, only as an exercise of the court's supervisory
power. If, on the other hand, an indictment may be challenged
under the fifth amendment in some instances, then any rule imposed in tainted indictment cases should be analyzed on the basis
of its faithfulness to constitutional limitations.
Current case law indicates that the courts' ability to overturn
an indictment on purely constitutional grounds is limited and that
therefore they may be forced to rely on their supervisory powers to
quash an indictment. In a series of cases beginning with Costello v.
United States," the Supreme Court has curtailed the power to
quash grand jury indictments that are based on evidence allegedly
6 5
obtained in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
In particular, the Court generally has upheld indictments when the
evidentiary improprieties occurred outside the grand jury process.
" 740 F.2d at 729. This may also be the unspoken reason for the Hinton court's decision to rely on its supervisory power, rather than on Kastigar and the fifth amendment, as
the basis for its ruling.
- 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
'6See Costello, 350 U.S. 359 (indictment based on hearsay evidence); Lawn v. United
States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) (use of documents from prior grand jury investigation that were
obtained from defendants without warning them against self-incrimination); Blue, 384 U.S.
at 251 (criminal indictment based on defendant's Tax Court filings in civil case); Calandra,
414 U.S. at 345 (seizure of records of loansharking activity in course of search for evidence
of bookmaking) ("[A]n indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground
that the grand jury acted on the basis of... information obtained in violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."). See also Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction
Without Adjudication, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 488 (1980) (case law even before Costello
"reveals a decided reluctance to dismiss indictments as long as some competent evidence
was presented to the grand jury") (footnote omitted). This article also presents an excellent
critical analysis of Costello and its progeny. Id. at 487-98.
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For example, the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, which prevents introduction at trial of evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or seizure, does not apply in a grand jury proceeding,
because the search or seizure is separate from that proceeding. 6
The use of such evidence thus does not corrupt the integrity of the
tribunal. On the other hand, one court has indicated that indictments may be dismissed in "flagrant cases" in which "the prosecutor's conduct significantly infringed upon the ability of the grand
6' 7
jury to exercise its independent judgment.
In deciding that indictments generally may not be quashed on
constitutional grounds, the Court has drawn an analogy to the information drawn by a prosecutor in a case without a grand jury:
since a prosecutor may indict on the basis of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, the grand jury should be able to do so as well. 8
The reasoning of the Court in the line of cases starting with
Costello is not persuasive. First, these cases do not concern improprieties within the grand jury process itself. At least two courts
have stated that those cases do not prohibit dismissal of an indictment where the grand jury process itself violates the rights of the
accused. e9 In United States v. Garrett, the Eighth Circuit held
that Costello and its progeny do not preclude "the power of a court
to dismiss an indictment where there is a strong likelihood that the
grand jury process itself violated the witness's fifth amendment
'70
privilege.
The Court's analogy between an indictment by a grand jury
and information drawn by a prosecutor is also unpersuasive because the grand jury system is a constitutionalrequirement. 71 The
requirement of grand jury indictment in all prosecutions for "capi-

See, e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. at 338; Costello, 350 U.S. at 359.
, United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1983).
08 See, e.g., Lawn, 355 U.S. at 349 ("[T]his Court has several times ruled that an indict"

ment returned by a legally constituted nonbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by a
prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the charge on the merits and
satisfies the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.").
: Garrett, 797 F.2d at 661; Zielezinski, 740 F.2d at 732 & n.3.
70 Garrett, 797 F.2d at 661. See also Zielezinski, 740 F.2d at 732 (Costello leaves open
the possibility of hearing challenges to indictments where improprieties occurred within the
grand jury process).
71

U.S. Const. amend. V states: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury. .. "
The grand jury was considered by the framers to be "an institution central to the protection
of our basic liberties." United States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1983). To
allow any action to cast doubt upon the independence and integrity of the grand jury is
impermissible. See id. ("The prosecutor may not circumvent this safeguard by overreaching
conduct that deprives the grand jury of autonomous and unbiased judgment.").
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tal, or otherwise infamous" crimes was designed precisely to protect individual liberties from arbitrary government authority, by
ensuring that such serious prosecutions could not be commenced
without deliberation by a body drawn from the community.72 The
Court's analogy ignores this central purpose and the constitutional
status of the grand jury proceeding, which render it of a very different nature from the largely discretionary decisions of prosecutors whether to indict in other cases.
Some Justices have presented other reasons for the Court's reluctance to overturn indictments. They have asserted that the
grand jury proceeding is not one "in which the guilt or innocence
of a defendant is determined, but merely one to decide whether
there is a prima facie case against [the defendant]. Any possible
prejudice to the defendant . . . thus disappears when a constitutionally valid trial jury later finds him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt." 3
This position does not, however, explain why the fifth amendment has been held applicable at all in grand jury proceedings despite the lack of finality of the grand jury's decision. In fact, the
reason why the privilege extends to grand jury proceedings is clear:
indictment can impose substantial prejudice on the defendant. Indictment at the very least forces him to the possible expense of a
trial. It may damage his reputation and economic position. Rather
than face the expense and risks of a trial, many defendants choose
to plea bargain. It is simply unrealistic to assert that the indictment itself can do no lasting damage to a defendant.
Perhaps the Court is unwilling to overturn an indictment because such a remedy can be costly. When an indictment is
quashed, a new grand jury must be empaneled and a new proceeding undertaken. The Court may be reluctant to impose these costs
as a matter of constitutional principle. But the social costs of excluding evidence at trial, in the Kastigarsituation, can be substantial too: suppression may mean an outright dismissal rather than
simply the expense of a new grand jury process. Such costs may
not be directly economic, but they cannot be ignored.74 At any
72 For historical development, see Kamisar et al., Criminal Procedure at 694-95 (cited

in note 56).
72 Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 575 (1979) (Justice Stewart, concurring, joined by
Justice Rehnquist) (footnote omitted).
" Nor have they been ignored: consider, for example, the Court's recent expressions of
skepticism as to the cost-effectiveness of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. See, e.g.,
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) ("The substantial social costs exacted by the
exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source
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rate, the protection of constitutional rights is very expensive in
many situations, and this seems an odd ground in the first place on
which to limit the scope of constitutional requirements.
Thus, the Court's reluctance to overturn indictments rests
largely on unsound assumptions. A powerful argument can be
made that there should be no general rule against quashing indictments on constitutional grounds. And even if one accepts the notion that a grand jury proceeding should not be overturned because of improprieties external to it, this cannot justify upholding
the tainted indictments at issue here, since the impropriety (use of
immunized testimony) occurs in the grand jury proceeding itself.
C.

Kastigar and the Fifth Amendment

Nevertheless, the Court may persist in its reluctance to quash
indictments even in tainted-indictment cases like Hinton and
Zielezinski. The question thus becomes whether the immunity
statute and the fifth amendment, as construed in Kastigar,require
any other procedures, and if so, whether those procedural requirements are applicable in the situation where the grand jury that
hears immunized testimony later returns an indictment.
It is clear that the fifth amendment analysis of Kastigar requires some procedure for ensuring that immunized testimony is
not used as a basis for an indictment. In Kastigar, the Court defined the constitutional limitations on the use and derivative use
immunity statute: the compelled testimony could not be used "in
any respect. '7 5 Since the fifth amendment applies to grand jury
proceedings, if the amendment prohibits use of compelled testimony as evidence at trial, it likewise must prohibit its use in a
grand jury proceeding." However, it does not clearly follow that
the courts are constitutionally required to adopt the procedural solution mandated for the particular situation in Kastigar.
In Kastigar, the Court held that the prosecution must meet a
"heavy burden" of affirmatively proving that it used sources independent from the immunized testimony to obtain an indictment
from the grand jury." The government's burden "is not limited to
of concern.").
71

See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (Court's emphasis). See also text at note 27 above.

70 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461 (testimony inadmissible at trial); cases cited in note 61

above.
7 406 U.S. at 461-62. The Court also stressed that the government must show that "all
of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources." Id. at
461-62 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted). For a similar point, see Garrett, 797 F.2d at
664.
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a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony. 7 8 The burden imposed is "heavy" because of the
practical difficulties of establishing reliance on a wholly-independent basis for the indictment. 79
Affirmative proof of independent sources should also be required in cases like Hinton and Zielezinski. The Kastigar Court
80
implicitly viewed such proof as a constitutional requirement.
Moreover, as several courts of appeals have reasoned since, the
same positive, practical benefits of the requirement of affirmative
proof evident in the typical Kastigar case would also operate in the
grand jury context: the requirement of affirmative proof would deter prosecutorial misuse of compelled testimony, furthering the underlying 1 purposes of the fifth amendment and the immunity
8
statute.
However, Kastigar does not mandate specific procedures to
prove an independent basis for indictment. In the absence of specific guidance, the trial courts have subsequently established some
procedures extrapolated from the Kastigar ruling, such as a pretrial hearing, to determine whether the prosecution can establish a
sufficient basis for the indictment wholly independent of the immunized testimony. 82 In general, these hearings have involved affidavits and live testimony from prosecuting officials and witnesses
who testified before the grand jury. 3 In some cases, courts have
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
Some courts have treated the "heavy burden" language of Kastigar as stating an
evidentiary requirement and have required the prosecution to prove an independent source
by a preponderance of the evidence. See Zielezinski, 740 F.2d at 734. The KastigarCourt,
however, concentrated on specifying what facts must be proved, rather than the degree of
certainty to which they must be proved.
80 A chief reason the immunity statute was upheld against constitutional challenge in
Kastigarwas that it placed the burden on the government to show an independent basis for
the indictment. 406 U.S. at 460-62.
' See Zielezinski, 740 F.2d at 734; Hinton, 543 F.2d at 1009; Garrett, 797 F.2d at 66465. Compare Henderson, 406 F. Supp. at 422 (holding Kastigar hearing unnecessary when
defendant challenged indictment, because of reluctance to quash indictments, but acknowledging strong criticism of its position).
82 See, e.g., Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1526; Romano, 583 F.2d at 3; United States v. Kurzer,
534 F.2d 511, 514 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Bianco, 534 F.2d 501, 509 (2d Cir. 1976);
United States v. First Western State Bank of Minot, N.D., 491 F.2d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 1974);
Dornau, 359 F. Supp. at 685. On the other hand, in Garrett, 797 F.2d at 659, Zielezinski, 740
F.2d at 728-29, and Hinton, 543 F.2d at 1007, the trial courts held no evidentiary hearings
on this issue before the cases were appealed.
83 See, e.g., Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1526-27; First Western State Bank of Minot, 491 F.2d at
784-85.
78

70
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undertaken in camera review of the transcripts of the grand jury
proceedings, although at times this remedy is disallowed on the
ground that it is inconsistent with the adversary nature of the
hearing because it discloses the evidence before trial.8 4 In other
cases, courts have held that either mere presentation of affidavits
or review of the grand jury transcript alone would be sufficient to
prove an independent source.8 5 The following section of the comment will assess the merits of the Kastigar hearing and of other
procedural requirements in the special context of cases like Hinton
and Zielezinski.
While the objective of the court in both the Kastigarsituation
and the tainted indictment context is the same-finding affirmative proof of an independent source for either an indictment or
trial evidence-the most effective procedures to obtain such proof
may not be the same in each context. The "Kastigar hearing,"
which was designed for cases involving challenges to the introduction of the evidence at trial, may not readily transfer to situations
where an indictment is challenged, since such a challenge questions
the use of the testimony by the grand jury.
III.

PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

This comment will examine three possible solutions to the
problem posed by Hinton and Zielezinski: a case by case determination by the court alone, a case by case hearing requirement, and
a per se rule overturning indictments under these circumstances.
However, the necessary threshold question in evaluating these
potential solutions is whether the courts have any authority is the
first place to quash indictments under one of the procedures
above-that is, either on a case by case finding that the grand jury
used the compelled testimony in indicting, or by a per se rule overturning all indictments returned by the grand jury that heard the
compelled testimony. The question is whether imposing any procedure is justified under either the Constitution or the courts' supervisory power.
The courts of appeals in Hinton,8 6 Zielezinski,87 and United
s4 For a discussion of this issue, see Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1532-34. The court in Byrd ultimately held in favor of in camera review. Id. at 1533.
"' For a detailed example of one such review in a slightly different context, see United
States v. Thanasouras, 368 F. Supp. 534, 536-37 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (indictment by second
grand jury upheld solely on basis of transcript of first grand jury hearing).
"8See 543 F.2d at 1010.
s,See 740 F.2d at 733-34.
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States v. Garrett8 invoked the supervisory power to impose procedural requirements that may not have been constitutionally mandated. The courts' refusal to rely on the Constitution in imposing
these requirements was understandable in light of the Supreme
Court's reluctance, expressed in the Costello line of cases, to create
an expansive constitutional right to quash indictments, 89 and in
light of Kastigar's failure to specify any particular procedures as
constitutionally required for the determination of whether there
existed an independent source of evidence. These decisions suggest
that the Court, if confronted with the question, might not invoke
the Constitution in order to resolve the procedural difficulties
posed by cases like Hinton and Zielezinski, even though the situation is fraught with constitutional problems. Therefore, if a solution that permits the quashing of indictments can be imposed at
all, it may have to be under the supervisory power of the federal
courts.
The supervisory power is generally invoked, even if neither the
Constitution nor the statute compels such action, when it will effectuate one or more of the following three purposes:" to "implement a remedy for violation of recognized.rights"; 9 1 to protect judicial integrity by prohibiting practices which undermine the public
image of the courts; 9 and to "deter illegal conduct." 93 Even if the
Constitution does not compel the use of the supervisory authority
to impose a particular remedy, the remedy chosen by the courts
may be materially influenced by the nature of the underlying constitutional requirements. In Zielezinski, the court stated that
"[c]onstitutional requirements can often guide us in the exercise of
our supervisory powers. '94 Thus, the constitutional prohibition
against any use of immune testimony may influence the courts to
exercise their supervisory power to quash indictments in cases like
Hinton and Zielezinski even though that remedy is not constitutionally required.9 5
" See 797 F.2d at 664.
See notes 63-68 and accompanying text above.
90 See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983). Compare McNabb, 318 U.S.
at 340-41, 345. For a criticism of the supervisory power, see the dissenting opinion of Justice
Reed in McNabb, 318 U.S. at 349 ("I am opposed to broadening the possibilities of defendants escaping punishment by these more rigorous technical requirements in the administration of justice.").
' Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505 (citation omitted).
89

9' Id. (citation omitted).
93 Id. (citation omitted).

91 740 F.2d at 730 (citation omitted).
91 See id. However, if the Constitution actually compels a particular rule, courts should
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The exercise of the supervisory power is appropriate in cases
like Hinton and Zielezinski because it will further each of the
three purposes of the power. 96 First, indictment by a tainted grand
jury violates constitutional rights and thus requires a remedy. Both
the right to an untainted grand jury proceeding and the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination are implicated by
the practice of allowing an indictment by the grand jury that was
exposed to the defendant's immunized testimony. In a close case,
where it is questionable whether the prosecution can prove the
prima facie case necessary to obtain an indictment, the immunized
witness's testimony and demeanor before the grand jury may improperly tip the scales against him.
Second, the integrity of the judicial system is threatened by
this indictment procedure. Even if the prosecutor's motives are
pure, the perception of impropriety is unavoidable. 97 Finally, exercise of the supervisory power in these cases will help to deter
prosecutorial misconduct.98 A prosecutor will be unlikely to seek
indictment by the same grand jury that heard a defendant's immunized testimony if she knows that a court will later quash this indictment under its supervisory power.
It might be argued that When the courts involve themselves in
quashing indictments, they become indirectly involved in
prosecutorial decisions and thereby undermine the separation of
powers. 9 The force of this argument depends on whether the
grand jury is properly conceived of as wholly an arm of the executive branch or as an entity somehow straddling the executive and
judicial branches. To the extent that fifth amendment guarantees
apply in the grand jury context, the courts must become involved
in this proceeding in order to review it for adherence to constitutional commands: the grand jury proceeding looks more like a judicial proceeding. More fundamentally, the grand jury acts as an in-

not impose that rule under the guise of their supervisory authority; if they do, subsequent
courts may also disregard constitutional demands because those demands are couched in
terms of the more permissive supervisory power.
" See Garrett, 797 F.2d at 664-65.
', The courts in both Hinton and Zielezinski recognized this problem. See Hinton, 543
F.2d at 1010; Zielezinski, 740 F.2d at 733-34.
" See Garrett, 797 F.2d at 664; Zielezinski, 740 F.2d at 733.
" See United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 1977): "[G]iven the constitutionally-based independence of the three actors-court, prosecutor and grand jury-we
believe a court may not exercise its 'supervisory power' in a way which encroaches on the
prerogatives of the other two unless there is a clear basis in fact and law for doing so." The
Chanen decision involved judicial involvement in prosecutorial decisions regarding evidentiary matters.
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dependent check on prosecutorial decisions in order to guard
individual rights, and so it cannot be seen as simply an appendage
of the prosecutor's office. Since the prosecutor is not free to continue a prosecution after a grand jury's refusal to indict a particular defendant (as she is free to halt the prosecution even if the
grand jury returns an indictment), the grand jury cannot properly
be deemed simply an arm of the executive. If remedying a tainted
grand jury proceeding interferes with prosecutorial decision making, that is a choice the framers of the fifth amendment made
when they imposed the grand jury requirement. Thus, the argument based on the separation of powers is not sufficiently persuasive to preclude the courts from exercising their supervisory powers in order to quash indictments.
Assuming the courts have authority to impose procedural requirements, the question then turns to which procedures would be
best. The cases have proposed three procedures for resolving the
problem posed by Hinton and Zielezinski. The first, used by the
trial courts in both of those cases, 100 involves no hearing: the court,
on its own, resolves the issue of whether the indictment is derived
from the compelled testimony. The second possible solution is to
hold a hearing on the issue, resolving only the clearest cases on the
basis of affidavits and transcripts of the grand jury proceeding.
This was the path required by the appellate courts in Zielezinski
and Garrett under their supervisory power.1 01 Finally, as in
Hinton, the court might fashion a per se rule that no indictment
handed down by the grand jury hearing the compelled testimony
can stand.102
The approach taken by the trial courts in Garrett, Hinton,
and Zielezinski-upholding the indictments with no hearing-was
appropriately rejected by the appellate courts in all three cases.
The difficulty with the procedure of having the court review the
issue on its own is that if it decides to uphold the indictment, the
constitutional challenge will have been dismissed without a hearing. The practice of allowing indictments by the same grand jury
that heard the defendant's immunized testimony is so "fraught
with applicable constitutional problems" 03 that it demands at
least a hearing. To allow such indictments to stand without a hearing is also to condone and invite serious prosecutorial misconduct.
100See Zielezinski, 740 F.2d at 728-29; Hinton, 543 F.2d at 1007.
101Zielezinski, 740 F.2d at 734; Garrett, 797 F.2d at 663-64.
102 543 F.2d at 1010.
103 Id.
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The final question is whether Hinton's per se rule or Zielezinski's hearing requirement is the best procedural solution to the
problem posed by these cases. At first sight, the hearing requirement of Garrett and Zielezinski appears to present some advantages over the Hinton rule. Unlike a uniform rule, the hearing requirement allows for a case by case determination on the issue of
improper use that would address the concerns, expressed in the
Costello line of cases, underlying the judicial reluctance to quash
indictments. 10 In addition, the hearing requirement is more firmly
grounded in the Supreme Court's decisions on the use immunity
statute, since the hearing requirement is indirectly derived from
0 5
the Court's decision in Kastigar.
However, Zielezinski's reliance on Kastigar seems misplaced.
The traditional Kastigar hearing involves proof of an independent
foundation for evidence to be introduced at trial, whereas the hearing in a case like Zielezinski must focus on proof that the grand
jury relied on testimony that was independent of the immunized
testimony as the basis for its indictment. In a tainted indictment
case, the hearing concentrates only tangentially on the prosecutor,
since the defendant objects primarily to the grand jury's reliance
on the immune testimony in its decision to indict.' The hearing
in such cases involves the difficult examination of the reasoning
used by the grand jury, as compared to the relatively simple assessment at a Kastigar hearing of the prosecutor's use of the immunized testimony. The Kastigar hearing is virtually worthless in
ferreting out a grand jury's improper use of compelled testimony.
Because of the evidentiary difficulties, the standard is virtually
useless. The government will find it practically impossible to show
the jury did not rely on the compelled testimony in returning the
indictment, and if the government did make such a showing the
107
defense would find it practically impossible to rebut.

"I

See notes 63-74 and accompanying text above.

1 See notes 82-84 and accompanying text above.
106 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Piccirillo, 400 U.S. at 568

(Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, consider Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 187 (1972); Note, 82 Yale L. J. at 181 (cited in note 5). For a contrary position, see
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 102-04 (White, J., concurring).
For a more detailed discussion of the evidentiary difficulties of "peering into" the mind
of each grand jury member, see text at notes 34-35 above, discussing Hinton's argument
that such a process is "both impractical and unpalatable." 543 F.2d at 1010.
101 In the typical Kastigar case, the prosecution holds almost all the evidence, making
it difficult for the defendant to defeat the prosecution's showing of an independent basis.
The evidentiary difficulties in Hinton-Zielezinski cases simply exacerbate this problem. See
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In contrast to these fruitless and costly inquiries, the Hinton
rule, which forbids indictment by a grand jury exposed to immunized testimony, will help to ensure protection of the witness's fundamental rights and will minimize the cost to society.10 8 The prosecution can simply submit the transcripts of the first grand jury
proceedings to a second grand jury, excising the immunized testimony. While this approach does not ensure that the prosecuting
authorities will not utilize the compelled testimony in order to obtain evidence for the second grand jury, it does guarantee that the
grand jury will not rely directly on the immunized testimony as the
basis for an indictment. 10 9 Once the rule is announced, prosecutors
will be able to modify their conduct to avoid quashing of
indictments.
Of course, as a corollary to the Hinton rule, failure to convene
a second, untainted grand jury would result in a mandatory quashing of the indictment. Since the burden of proof in the Zielezinski
hearing is "virtually impossible"1 1 to meet, the courts' decisions in
both Zielezinski and Hinton would result in a quashing of the indictment in most cases. The advantage Of Hinton, however, is not
that it necessarily achieves a improved result, but that it will
achieve the same result as Zielezinski at a decreased cost to the
system and with increased certainty for the defendant. It also
reduces the number of cases in which that result is necessary by
modifying prosecutorial conduct ex ante. Therefore, because the
courts can minimize the negative effect of compelled testimony for
the defendant while leaving open the possibility of indictments
based upon untainted evidence at a minimal cost, the courts
should adopt the Hinton per se rule as an exercise of their supervisory power.
The per se rule may not find any foundation in the procedural
aspects of Kastigar,but it is consistent with the underlying goal of
protecting the privilege against self-incrimination. The courts in
both Hinton and Zielezinski recognized that it is improper for
prosecutors to engage in the manipulation of the grand jury process that is at issue here. In Zielezinski, the court stated that
"[p]rosecutors should avoid permitting grand juries to indict wit-

Hinton, 543 F.2d at 1010.
10" See id. at 1009 (noting that argument that submitting evidence to second grand jury
is too costly and time-consuming is "particularly unconvincing").
109 An ordinary Kastigar hearing may be held in order to determine whether the prose-

cution's evidence at the second proceeding was derived from a source wholly independent of
the immunized testimony. See Thanasouras, 368 F. Supp. at 534.
110 Hinton, 543 F.2d at 1007; see text at note 107 above.
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nesses who have testified before them under grants of immunity." ' Both courts realized that there is little justification, economic or otherwise, for this threat to the integrity of the grand
jury process.12
CONCLUSION

The courts should adopt the per se rule of Hinton and prohibit indictment of a witness granted use and derivative use immunity when the indictment is by the same grand jury that heard the
compelled testimony. This rule ensures that a witness forced to
testify is left in the same position as he would have been had he
not been compelled to forego assertion of his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. It also puts an end to an unnecessary and constitutionally suspect practice engaged in by a
small number of prosecuting attorneys and thus protects the integrity of the grand jury process.
Charles F. Smith

n, 740 F.2d at 734.
",

See id.; Garrett, 797 F.2d at 664; Hinton, 543 F.2d at 1010.

